Contesting the Meaning of Intergroup Disadvantage: Towards a Psychology of Resistance by Leach, CW & Livingstone, AG
Running Head: Meaning of disadvantage 
 
 
Contesting the meaning of inter-group disadvantage: Towards a psychology of resistance 
Colin Wayne Leach 
Andrew G. Livingstone 
 
 
 
 
For K. Stroebe & S. de Lemus (Eds.) "Resisting and confronting disadvantage: from individual 
coping to societal change," Journal of Social Issues 
 
 
 
 
Author note 
Colin Wayne Leach, Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA. 
Andrew Livingstone, School of Psychology, University of Exeter, UK. 
We thank John Drury, Sole de Lemus, and Katherine Stroebe for their comments on a 
previous draft. 
Address correspondence to C.W. Leach, Department of Psychology, University of 
Connecticut, Storrs, CT, 06521-1020, U.S.A (e-mail: colin.leach@uconn.edu).  
Abstract 
A prevailing view in psychology is that inter-group disadvantage poses a serious threat to 
psychological well-being. Lower self-esteem and out-group favoritism are two of the most 
examined forms of psychological damage thought to follow from inter-group disadvantage. We 
review theory and research on lower self-esteem and out-group favoritism with close attention to 
the nature of the evidence suggesting that inter-group disadvantage is detrimental 
psychologically. We argue that this evidence is not as strong or unambiguous as is widely 
believed. This has likely led to an under-estimation of psychological resistance to disadvantage – 
that middle ground between the extremes of surviving at subsistence levels of psychological 
well-being and confronting disadvantage. We propose that greater attention to the psychological 
meaning that the disadvantaged give their position enables a more accurate assessment of the 
diverse forms of psychological resistance to group disadvantage. 
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Contesting the meaning of inter-group disadvantage: Towards a psychology of resistance  
 Inequality is on many peoples’ minds. Recent popular revolts around the world have 
focused on the ways in which contemporary practice and policy may systematically disadvantage 
many in society (i.e., the “99%”). And, a great deal of recent work across the human sciences 
documents that the most disadvantaged in society suffer economic, educational, political, health, 
and other detriments (see Adler et al., 1994; Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999; Pascoe 
& Smart-Richman, 2009; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Parallel to the view in more macro-social 
fields that disadvantage causes many material detriments, the micro-social approach of social 
psychology tends to view disadvantage as causing many psychological detriments. Psychological 
work on stigma, discrimination, stereotype threat, low power, low status, micro-aggressions, etc. 
suggests a wide variety of ways in which members of disadvantaged groups suffer 
psychologically as a result of their material disadvantage (for reviews, see Barreto & Ellemers, 
2010; Crocker & Major, 1989; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Steele, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). These include poorer individual mental health, coping strategies, cognitive function and 
performance, emotion- and self-regulation, inter-personal relationships, and less positive group 
identity and function. 
Although there is considerable work on coping with disadvantage and “protecting against” 
or “buffering” stigma, most of this work views such efforts as attempts to mitigate against the 
otherwise deleterious psychological effects of disadvantage (Barreto & Ellemers, 2010; Crocker 
et al., 1998; Henry, 2009; Major et al., 2002). Without these efforts, the presumption is that the 
injury of material disadvantage is accompanied by the insult of psychological debilitation. Thus, 
the prevailing view is that the best that the disadvantaged can do is to work hard to survive at 
subsistence levels of psychological well-being. Without constant effort to survive 
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psychologically, societal assaults to their self-esteem and the like would presumably lead the 
disadvantaged to self-hatred, depression, and despair. Of course, a quite separate literature in 
sociology and social and political psychology eschews this focus on survival at subsistence 
levels of psychological well-being, preferring instead to examine what leads the disadvantaged to 
protest against their position. This work on “collective action” emphasizes an angry and 
efficacious view of societal disadvantage that fuels direct confrontational action to reduce 
disadvantage for the group as a whole (for recent reviews, see Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & 
Bialosiewicz, 2012; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012).  
Thus, when considered as a whole, psychology appears to characterize the disadvantaged 
as having two choices regarding their position in society – to survive at subsistence levels of 
psychological well-being or to fight to alter societal systems of disadvantage. However, no one 
can fight all the time. And, there is much more to life than subsistence survival. Thus, 
psychology’s focus on the two extremes of surviving and fighting disadvantage has left the 
everyday psychology of resistance under-examined (see also Haslam & Reicher, 2012). Between 
the two extremes of surviving and fighting lies the everyday experience of giving psychological 
meaning to one’s disadvantage by perceiving, interpreting, feeling, and acting on it. Despite 
several attempts to explicate the diversity of ways in which disadvantage can be resisted 
psychologically (e.g., Pettigrew, 1967; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 
1990), little contemporary work in psychology does this (but see recent attempts by Pratto, Bou 
Zeineddine, Stewart, 2013 and Sweetman, Leach, Spears, Pratto, & Saab, 2013).  
As sociologists (see Hollander & Einwohner, 2004; Raby, 2005; Vanneman & Cannon, 
1987) and other macro-social theorists (see Gramsci, 1971; Sandoval, 2000; Scott, 1990) have 
pointed out, psychological resistance to disadvantage comes in diverse forms, varying in terms of 
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how overt or covert it is, and/or how active or passive it is, for example. However, at the heart of 
psychological resistance is opposition to dominance by determining for oneself the psychological 
meaning of one’s disadvantage (Fanon, 1967; Martín-Baró, 1994; Sandoval, 2000). More 
specifically, psychological resistance is the myriad ways in which the disadvantaged assert their 
own view of themselves and the world despite dominant pressures to accept societal messages to 
the contrary. As shown in macro-social analyses, psychological resistance can come in the form 
of a subculture’s rituals (e.g., Hall & Jefferson, 1976) or covert but subversive ways of resisting 
management strictures in the workplace (Yücesan-Özdemir, 2003; see also Scott, 1990). Claimed 
ignorance and inability to learn, feigned misunderstanding of instructions, and losing track of 
time during coffee and lunch breaks, can all be forms of psychological resistance to material 
disadvantage. In psychology, psychological resistance has been observed in implicit resistance to 
gender stereotypical roles (e.g., de Lemus, Spears, Bukowski, Lupiáñez, & Moya, 2013) through 
to the use of humor in the form of satire and ridicule directed at powerful others (Billig, 2005).  
What unites all of these forms of psychological resistance is that they represent active, if 
at times subtle or covert, attempts to resist material disadvantage in psychological terms rather 
than in the material terms of confrontational protest designed to directly encourage societal 
change. Although such psychological efforts at resistance have often been viewed as poor 
substitutes for protest (e.g., as “social creativity” or “weapons of the weak”), psychological 
resistance is a clear form of opposition. Psychological resistance is also a more practical exercise 
of power than most psychological treatments allow. In the context of violent repression, 
structural disadvantage, political marginalization, and societal devaluation, the psychological 
meaning of their position is the one thing over which the disadvantaged exercise the most control 
(Gramsci, 1971). Through refusing to internalize material disadvantage, psychological resistance 
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enables people to maintain that poverty of the purse does not equate to poverty of the spirit.  
Resistance in psychological (rather than material) terms is of clear importance to the 
discipline of psychology; indeed, it is what psychologists can best study. Additionally, 
psychological resistance is likely to be more common than the direct protest of disadvantage. As 
Gramsci (1971) pointed out some time ago, the “frontal assault” of direct confrontation of the 
advantaged is exceedingly difficult in Western liberal democracies where ostensibly egalitarian 
ideology and practice reinforce disadvantage at many different levels of the society (see also 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Thus, Gramsci argued that in societies where the “cultural hegemony” 
of the advantaged prevail, the disadvantaged are best served by engaging in a “war of position” 
that aims to strategically counter the hegemony of the advantaged through the pursuit of their 
own culture and system of value. Unlike the direct, obvious, and often short-lived confrontation 
of the advantaged, this psychological resistance is a more strategic, multi-faceted, and protracted 
challenge focused on freeing the disadvantaged from hegemony. Rather than a rush to the 
barricades, psychological resistance is a “long march to freedom” that can also serve as a basis 
for more direct protest when it is necessary, and when it is wise (Fanon, 1967; Gramsci, 1971).  
In this paper, we build upon the notion of psychological resistance by reviewing theory 
and research on lower self-esteem and out-group favoritism in disadvantaged groups. We suggest 
that inattention to the psychological meaning that the disadvantaged give their position has 
enabled ambiguous evidence to be interpreted as indicative of psychological damage. In some 
cases, even contrary evidence regarding lower self-esteem and out-group favoritism is 
interpreted as indicative of the psychological damage of disadvantage. This has likely led to an 
under-estimation of psychological resistance to disadvantage. Indeed, having equal levels of self-
esteem and equally positive implicit evaluations of in-group and out-group may be seen as 
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impressive psychological resistance in the face of societal devaluation. We then elaborate on 
reasons why even apparent out-group favoritism may be indicative of psychological resistance 
rather than internalized inferiority, focusing on the multiple meanings that can be conveyed by 
highlighting an out-group’s “superiority”.. As we elaborate in our conclusion, this is an issue that 
has more than theoretical importance -- the social and policy stakes are high. As Owusu-Bempah 
and Howitt (1999) argue, a focus on psychological detriments caused by inter-group 
disadvantage risks directing policy and practice towards palliative support for the 
psychologically damaged disadvantaged, rather than towards material disadvantage itself. 
The Psychological Meaning of Inter-group Disadvantage 
In psychology, as in many other behavioral sciences, there is a great deal of evidence that 
material inter-group disadvantage is linked to disadvantages in physical health and well-being 
(for reviews, see Adler et al., 1994; Clark et al., 1999; Pascoe & Smart-Richman, 2009). The 
poor, disenfranchised minorities, and other disadvantaged groups suffer greater stress and illness 
and have poorer chances of recovery. In addition to these physical effects of inter-group 
disadvantage, psychology has long viewed material disadvantage as constituting a psychological 
threat to the disadvantaged that must be protected against if it is not to cause the psychological 
damage of lower self-esteem, self-harm, undermined motivation to succeed, and the like (see 
Owusu-Bempah & Howitt, 1999, for a critical discussion). As Steele (1997) put it, the 
disadvantaged face a “threat in the air.”  
Although there is a small link between perceiving discrimination against oneself and 
poorer psychological well-being (for a quantitative synthesis, see Pascoe & Smart-Richman, 
2009), there is much less evidence than is commonly presumed that inter-group disadvantage 
translates directly into psychological detriment (for discussions, see Crocker & Major, 1989; 
Meaning of disadvantage       8 
Pettigrew, 1967, Vanneman & Cannon, 1987; for quantitative syntheses, see Smith et al., 2012; 
Twenge & Crocker, 2002). In fact, decades of research on relative deprivation suggest that the 
disadvantaged suffer poorer physical and psychological well-being than the advantaged mainly 
when they view their lot as an individual rather than as a shared, systemic, disadvantage of their 
group (for a quantitative synthesis, see Smith & Ortiz, 2002). The study of individual self-esteem 
among the disadvantaged is perhaps one of the most dramatic examples of a failure to find direct 
and obvious psychological detriment from inter-group disadvantage. This influential line of 
research highlights the importance of examining the psychological meaning that the 
disadvantaged give their position, rather than assuming that the disadvantaged necessarily 
internalize societal devaluation and thus suffer lower self-esteem. 
Lower Self-Esteem 
The extensive research in the U.S. on ethnic differences in self-esteem shows little 
evidence that disadvantaged groups suffer lower self-esteem. In fact, in a quantitative synthesis 
of over 250 independent comparisons of White and Black children’s self-esteem conducted by 
Gray-Little and Hafdahl (2000), Blacks had slightly higher self-esteem than whites. Importantly, 
there was little difference between the studies conducted as early as 1965 and those conducted 
later. In a quantitative synthesis of an even larger set of studies, Twenge and Crocker (2002) 
found Black self-esteem to be equal to that of whites, even in studies conducted between 1956 
and 1969. Thus, Black self-esteem was equal to that of whites before the equality in law brought 
about by the civil rights movement. In addition, Blacks born before 1949 showed equal self-
esteem to Whites despite the fact that they were born under the institutionalized societal 
devaluation of segregated schools only lifted in principle in 1954. Although there is less 
extensive evidence regarding Hispanic-Americans, Twenge and Crocker’s quantitative synthesis 
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showed this disadvantaged ethnic minority to have about equal self-esteem to that of Whites. 
That Black and Hispanic people in the U.S. have self-esteem equal to that of Whites 
should be taken as evidence against the view that inter-group disadvantage typically leads to 
psychological damage. Yet, this comprehensive evidence tends not to be taken as 
disconfirmation of the popular hypothesis. Instead, many researchers suggest that ethnic minority 
in-group identity, social creativity, or social support buffer against the lower self-esteem they 
expect to observe – thereby maintaining the original hypothesis of psychological detriment 
following from disadvantage (for reviews, see Barreto & Ellemers, 2010; Crocker et al., 1998; 
Henry, 2009; Major et al., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
The ambiguity in the interpretation of ethnic minority’s self-esteem is further highlighted 
in Twenge and Crocker’s (2002) quantitative synthesis of Asian-American self-esteem. Although 
they found Asian-Americans to show moderately lower self-esteem than Whites, this was not 
interpreted as an indication of psychological damage to Asian-Americans from disadvantage. 
Instead, it was suggested that the lower self-esteem of Asian-Americans was at least partly due to 
a modesty based in lower individualism and other more collectivist values and practices. That 
values and practices can help determine empirical differences between groups in self-esteem is 
one important reason to attend to the psychological meaning that the disadvantaged themselves 
give to their group membership and to their position in society. If Asian-Americans’ lower self-
esteem can be the product of Asian-Americans’ values and practices, then surely Hispanic-
American’s equal self-esteem and African-American’s higher self-esteem can be the product of 
these group’s values and practices. For example, recent research on contingencies of self-worth 
has shown groups to vary a good deal in how much others’ evaluations of them, competition, 
physical appearance, and suchlike serve as bases of their self-esteem (for a review, see Crocker, 
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Luhtanen, & Sommers, 2004). 
More profoundly, it is unclear what level of self-esteem would be viewed as a sign of 
healthy and appropriate self-evaluation among the disadvantaged. As equal or higher self-esteem 
than the advantaged are interpreted as the result of self-protective strategies, even these apparent 
signs of psychological well-being are denied the disadvantaged. In essence, this approach to self-
esteem imposes the psychological meaning of inter-group disadvantage from outside, obscuring 
the need to understand the psychological meaning that the disadvantaged provide to themselves. 
As it turns out, members of disadvantaged groups have long offered alternative hypotheses about 
the psychological meaning of their lot that could be used to complicate psychological approaches. 
Disadvantage Speaks 
For decades, poets, priests, and politicians from disadvantaged groups have argued 
against the view that their psychology is determined in large part by the material fact of 
disadvantage. In The Fire Next Time, African American writer James Baldwin (1963) explicitly 
criticized the idea that African-Americans had no choice but to evaluate themselves by the 
standards the “white world”: 
white people, who had robbed black people of their liberty and who profited by this theft 
every hour that they lived, had no moral ground on which to stand. And those virtues 
preached but not practiced by the white world were merely another means of holding 
Negroes in subjection (p. 23). 
Across the human sciences, scholars from disadvantaged groups have also argued that the 
psychology of the disadvantaged is less dependent on the standards of the advantaged than is 
often presumed. The sociologist W.E.B Dubois’s (1903/1994) The Souls of Black Folk is often 
cited in psychology as arguing that “...the facing of so vast a prejudice could not but bring the 
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inevitable self-questioning, self-disparagement, and lowering of ideals which ever accompany 
repression and breed in an atmosphere of contempt and hate.” (p.6) However, this book is 
actually a hymnal for Black people’s psychological resistance to racism, through faith, patience, 
humor, rhyme, indignation, cynicism, song, and so on. Likewise, scholars of liberation 
psychology have long argued that while the debilitating intent and potential of oppression is 
clear, its outcome is not, because psychological resistance is natural and necessary for the 
disadvantaged (e.g., Fanon, 1967; Martín-Baró, 1994). This view has been echoed in numerous 
political, historical, and other macro-social approaches to psychological resistance to material 
disadvantage (e.g., Gramsci, 1971; Scott, 1990; Sandoval, 2000; Vanneman & Cannon, 1987). 
Despite regular claims of taking the perspective of the disadvantaged, little psychological work 
starts from the assumption that the disadvantaged may determine for themselves the 
psychological meaning that they give their existence (of which disadvantage is only a part). 
Out-group Favoritism 
Another of the oft-discussed examples of the supposed psychological damage of 
disadvantage is the phenomenon called out-group favoritism (self-hatred, inferiority complex, or 
internalized prejudice, in other disciplines). In psychology, the assumption that a normal and 
healthy psychology leads individuals to favor themselves and their own kind over others means 
that out-group favoritism – in the form of preferential evaluation and treatment of an advantaged 
out-group – is taken as an unambiguous sign that the disadvantaged suffer psychologically from 
their position in society (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
One of the most cited empirical examples of out-group favoritism is that of Clark and 
Clark’s “doll studies” where White and Black children were asked to indicate a preference for 
Black or White dolls (for a review, see Clark & Clark, 1947). These studies are typically 
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presented as documenting healthy White in-group favoritism and debilitating Black out-group 
favoritism because Black children did not favor Black dolls as much as White children favored 
White dolls. In more recent studies of out-group favoritism, the disadvantaged can show their 
self-hatred by preferring to interact with advantaged peers; believing the advantaged to be more 
agentic, successful, or good in general; or allotting more symbolic or material resources to an 
advantaged out-group than to a disadvantaged in-group (for reviews, see Bettencourt et al., 2001; 
Crocker & Major, 1989; Diehl, 1990; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
Theoretical perspectives. System justification theory proposes that people are motivated 
to justify existing societal arrangements, whether they advantage or disadvantage their in-group. 
Based on the assumption that this system justification motive overrides motives for a positive in-
group identity, system justification theory predicts that disadvantaged groups will show less in-
group favoritism than advantaged groups (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Thus, evidence of out-group 
favoritism is taken at face value to indicate that disadvantaged groups have internalized their 
position and thus evaluate themselves negatively (Jost et al., 2004). Even when disadvantaged 
groups show in-group favoritism, it is suggested that this apparently positive evaluation of the in-
group belies a deeper, more implicit, preference for the advantaged (e.g., Jost, Pelham, & 
Carvallo, 2002). Thus, as in the study of ethnic minority self-esteem, system justification theory 
doubts apparent evidence of psychological well-being among the disadvantaged. 
Social dominance theory focuses on a “general tendency for humans to form and 
maintain group-based hierarchy” (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004, p.846). One of its 
key propositions is that the endorsement of “legitimizing myths” by both advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups leads to “behavioral asymmetry” between the groups. Put simply, 
members of advantaged groups are said to act in more in-group favoring ways than members of 
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disadvantaged groups (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, chapter 9). Disadvantaged groups instead 
engage in more self-debilitating behavior such as crime, violence, and intellectual under-
performance. In this way, social dominance theory views the disadvantaged as collaborators in 
their devaluation in society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
Another influential theory that broaches the issue of out-group favoritism is social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In contrast to system justification and social dominance 
theory, social identity theory is more concerned with the social structural conditions under which 
the disadvantaged accept or reject their position. For example, out-group favoritism is thought 
likely when “social mobility” out of a disadvantaged in-group is possible because intergroup 
boundaries are perceived as permeable, and/or when status differences are perceived as a 
legitimate basis for their devaluation in society (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Wright et al., 1990; see 
also Derks, van Laar, Ellemers, & Raghoe, in press; Kulich et al., in press; Tausch et al., in 
press). Nevertheless, when out-group favoritism is observed it is taken to indicate the 
psychological damage of disadvantage, which is dubbed “negative social identity” (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). 
Psychological Meaning. Notwithstanding the many important differences between 
theories of system justification, social dominance, and social identity, they share the view that 
out-group favoritism is an unambiguous indicator of the psychological damage that inter-group 
disadvantage has. However, there are at least three reasons to doubt that the psychological 
meaning of out-group favoritism is so straightforward.  
First, the psychological meaning of out-group favoritism is ambiguous because out-group 
favoritism is a heterogeneous concept that is assessed in a wide variety of ways (for reviews, see 
Bettencourt et al., 2001; Diehl, 1990). Out-group favoritism can be assessed with either direct 
Meaning of disadvantage       14 
(“explicit”) or indirect (“implicit”) methods; by attributing positive and negative attributes to 
groups; by allocating positive and negative resources, or positive and negative treatment; or by 
preferences for things produced by the groups (e.g., essays, t-shirts). When resources are 
allocated, these may be symbolic or material (e.g., grades vs. money). The sheer number of ways 
that out-group favoritism is examined makes it difficult to know if each is equally indicative of 
poorer psychological well-being when it is expressed by the disadvantaged.  
A second ambiguity in interpreting the psychological meaning of expressions of out-
group favoritism comes from the fact that the construct is purely relative. A disadvantaged group 
is said to show out-group favoritism when it gives itself very few resources and gives the 
advantaged many resources. Or, a disadvantaged group is said to show out-group favoritism 
when it gives itself many resources and gives the advantaged slightly more. Because the notion 
of favoritism focuses on the magnitude of a relative difference it is unable to specify the quality 
of this difference and therefore it leaves its psychological meaning for the disadvantaged 
ambiguous. As we discuss in more detail below, there are many reasons to ‘prefer’ an 
advantaged group that have nothing to do with devaluing one’s disadvantaged group. Such 
‘preference’ can instead reflect reality constraints, or have a strategic, ingroup-favoring agenda 
Third, there is ambiguity in what psychological meaning can be inferred from the 
characteristics that the disadvantaged attribute to groups in studies of out-group favoritism. 
Characteristics such as power, agency, competence and dominance are seen as inherently “status-
defining” characteristics that are attributed to the advantaged, whereas characteristics such as 
warmth, communality and morality are seen as “alternative” characteristics that are attributed to 
the disadvantaged. Ascribing more “high-status” characteristics to the out-group and more “low-
status” characteristics to the in-group is seen to justify the in-group’s disadvantage. This view is 
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central to social dominance theory and system justification theory, as well as being central to 
many socio-functional models of inter-group stereotyping (e.g., Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; 
Eagly & Mladinic, 1994). However, this view presumes that the disadvantaged and the 
advantaged share a consensual view of the characteristics possessed by each group and that their 
ascription of these characteristics has the same psychological meaning for disadvantaged or 
advantaged alike. Despite the importance of this assumption, it is rarely examined empirically 
(for reviews, see Bettencourt et al., 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Spears et al., 2001). It is 
simply assumed that expressions of out-group favoritism through stereotyping the advantaged as 
more agentic, powerful, and competent show that the disadvantaged think poorly of themselves 
(for reviews, see Bettencourt et al., 2001; Diehl, 1990). Or, based on the assumption of 
stereotype consensus, many studies prevent comparisons by simply combining the stereotypes of 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups. For example, in the most extensive cross-cultural study of 
sex stereotypes, women and men’s beliefs about the two groups are not formally compared 
(Williams & Best, 1990). And in nearly every study of competence and warmth stereotypes, 
members of advantaged and disadvantaged groups are examined with no attention to their group 
membership or its material position (for a review, see Cuddy et al. 2008).  
Surprisingly little research has examined the psychological meaning of out-group 
favoritism by the disadvantaged. As a result little consideration has been given to the possibility 
that the disadvantaged may be expressing psychological resistance when they show apparent out-
group favoritism by stereotyping the advantaged as especially agentic, powerful, and competent. 
Indeed, in the context of a cultural hegemony that aims to assert the lesser value of the 
disadvantaged, the psychological meaning that they give their own and others presumed 
characteristics is an obvious battleground (Tajfel & Turner 1979; outside of psychology, see 
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Gramsci, 1971; Sandoval, 2000; Vanneman & Cannon, 1987). As Audre Lorde put it, “the 
master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.” Disagreeing with the presumed 
consensus in stereotypes and altering the meaning that one gives stereotypes that are difficult to 
disagree with are two of the more obvious forms of psychological resistance to disadvantage. 
This form of psychological resistance should not be under-estimated by seeing it as merely a 
mode of survival or a way station on the way to protest. Defining the meaning of disadvantage 
for oneself is a refusal to be determined from without. Such psychological resistance is a clear 
opposition to disadvantage that is focused on determining one’s psychology from within (the 
disadvantaged in-group). As we detail below, we believe that ample evidence of psychological 
resistance in studies that purport to show out-group favoritism is obscured by inattention to the 
meaning that the disadvantaged give to their inter-group stereotypes. 
Interpreting Egalitarianism as Out-group favoritism. Among those who regularly 
conduct studies of group bias with the sort of arbitrary groups created in the minimal group 
paradigm (e.g., blues vs. greens; under-estimators vs. over-estimators), it is an open secret that a 
majority of participants evaluate the groups and distribute symbolic or material resources equally 
(see Diehl, 1990). Thus, in arbitrary groups, an egalitarian lack of preference for the in-group is 
the norm despite the fact that a preference among a minority of group members routinely 
produces a small degree of in-group favoritism overall (for a review, see Mullen et al., 1992). In 
the case of arbitrary groups, no one could or would interpret the absence of in-group favoritism 
as anything other than a preference for inter-group equality. However, when a similarly 
egalitarian lack of preference for the in-group is observed among the disadvantaged it is 
routinely interpreted as if it were an indication of out-group favoritism (see Jost et al., 2004; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This tendency is long-standing, as it goes all the way back to Clark and 
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Clark’s doll studies in the 1940s. Although the doll studies are typically presented as showing 
strong out-group favoritism because Black children overwhelmingly preferred White dolls, only 
weak to moderate out-group favoritism was typically observed in these studies. In fact, about 30-
40% of Black children tended to prefer Black dolls (for a review, see Clark & Clark, 1947). In 
the more segregated Southern U.S., where Blacks often constituted majorities in their local 
neighborhoods and schools, Black children showed closer to equal preference for Black and 
White dolls. As with the well-established finding of equal self-esteem among African-Americans, 
Black children’s near equal preference for Black and White dolls is somehow interpreted as an 
out-group favoritism that indicates the psychological damage of racism.  
Interestingly, recent studies using indirect (or “implicit”) methods tend to find that 
African Americans show little favoritism for Black over White images. Indeed, a quantitative 
synthesis of thousands of studies using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) found African-
Americans to show only the slightest favoritism in their evaluations of Black over White faces, 
group labels, or names (Nosek et al., 2007). In similar studies, Dunham, Baron, and Banaji, 
(2007) found Hispanic-American children to show no favoritism for their in-group over Whites. 
K.R. Olson, Crawford, and Devlin (2009) also used the IAT to examine out-group favoritism 
among gay men in the UK. They found only a slight preference for “same-sex” over “opposite-
sex”. And, Jost et al. (2002) found students at a lower-status university to show little favoritism 
toward their in-group relative to that shown toward a higher-status university using the IAT.  
Despite the absence of out-group favoritism in these studies, most of these researchers 
interpreted minimal in-group favoritism as an indication of out-group favoritism because 
advantaged groups tend to show much stronger in-group favoritism than disadvantaged groups 
(but see Brandt, 2013; M.A Olson et al., 2009; Rubin, Badea, & Jetten, in press). However, as in 
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studies revealing equal self-esteem, equal preference for Black and White dolls, and minimal 
explicit in-group favoritism, there is little reason to presume that this apparent egalitarianism in 
implicit evaluation of in-group and out-group has a deleterious psychological meaning for the 
disadvantaged. Instead of interpreting the disadvantaged’s relative lack of in-group favoritism as 
equivalent to the self-hatred of out-group favoritism, one could interpret the disadvantaged as 
relatively egalitarian in contrast to the extreme in-group favoritism displayed by the advantaged. 
In fact, this interpretation represents a more obvious and parsimonious option. It is unclear why 
the behavior of the advantaged is assumed to be the standard by which to judge the behavior of 
the disadvantaged and its psychological meaning for the disadvantaged.  
Highlighting Out-group Advantage: More is Less. More out-group favoritism by the 
disadvantaged is often less indicative of psychological detriment than is typically presumed. 
Even what appears to be clear out-group favoritism by the disadvantaged can have a 
psychological meaning more in line with psychological resistance than is commonly presumed, 
for at least three reasons.  
First, the expression of out-group favoritism by the disadvantaged is constrained by the 
social reality of inequality in the context. Thus, objectively better performance by an advantaged 
out-group can place “reality constraints” on the in-group favoritism that the disadvantaged can 
reasonably claim (Spears et al., 2001). Indeed, in many studies of out-group favoritism, an 
experimental manipulation of group performance is conducted and advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups are asked to attribute characteristics related to this performance to each 
group. As a result, it is no surprise that Mullen et al.’s quantitative synthesis (1992) showed that 
in studies of experimentally-created groups that include such manipulations, the disadvantaged 
show less in-group favoritism than the advantaged, especially on characteristics Mullen et al. 
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thought to be related to the disadvantage. Experimental manipulations of inequality through 
seemingly objective, consensual, or otherwise legitimate performance feedback is likely to 
constrain the in-group favoritism of the disadvantaged in a way that real-world inequality may 
not. Further evidence that out-group favoritism is tempered by “reality constraints” comes from 
the more recent quantitative synthesis of Bettencourt et al. (2001). They found disadvantaged 
groups to show less in-group favoritism than advantaged groups in those areas that Bettencourt et 
al. defined as “relevant” to the out-group’s disadvantage. These results suggest that a clear 
material disadvantage constrains claims of in-group favoritism among the disadvantaged but 
facilitates them in the advantaged. However, the crucial caveat to this is that evaluations of out-
group ‘superiority’ do not in themselves reflect the internal (or internalized) legitimacy of out-
group superiority (Spears et al., 2001; see also Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón, & de 
Lemus, in press). 
Second, closer attention to the presumably positive characteristics that the disadvantaged 
attribute to the advantaged reveal that they may not imply as much positivity as many 
psychologists presume. For example, in the study of sex stereotypes, it has been repeatedly 
demonstrated that women agree with men that men are much more “agentic” than women, 
whereas women are believed to be more “communal” than men. It is typically presumed a priori, 
and thus never assessed, that women view men’s agency as unambiguously positive and as 
indicative of why men are advantaged in power, status, and material wealth (for a review, see 
Leach, Bilali, and Pagliaro, 2015; Williams & Best, 1990). However, when women express the 
view that men are more agentic they are also characterizing men as more dominant, aggressive, 
violent, competitive, and concerned with power, status, and achievement (for reviews, see Eagly 
& Mladinic, 1990; Williams & Best, 1990). Research by Rudman and colleagues using the 
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indirect measure of the IAT also shows that women’s attribution of power and status to men 
includes a great deal of negativity regarding its misuse in dominant or violent ways (e.g., 
Rudman, Greenwald, & McGhee, 2001). Thus, a closer look at the greater agency attributed to 
men shows that it is a less flattering view than is commonly presumed. It should not be 
surprising that the disadvantaged can imbue a view of the advantaged as greater in power, status, 
competence, and achievement with critique. Rather than simply acquiescing to power and status, 
the disadvantaged have good reason to worry about its malevolent use to maintain their 
disadvantage. 
Third, disadvantaged groups can acknowledge out-group advantage with the expressed 
purpose of highlighting and challenging the social value placed on this apparent “superiority” 
(Spears et al., 2001). In other words, apparent out-group favoritism by the disadvantaged may be 
a means of confirming disadvantage and highlighting its size and its illegitimacy. For example, 
the Clarks, and other social psychologists, used their “doll studies” to oppose U.S. racial 
segregation by arguing that this material disadvantage led to the psychological damage of self-
hatred among African-American children. In Nosek et al.’s (2007) meta-analysis of IAT studies 
of in-group favoritism, women associated their group less with science and with careers, 
consistent with supposedly consensual stereotypes that establish men as better at science and 
more career-oriented. However, the psychological meaning of this apparent out-group favoritism 
for women is not so obvious. Associating science and career with men rather than women could 
also mean that women believe that sexual inequality in science and the workplace unfairly 
advantages man and disadvantages women. Similarly, Van Knippenberg (1978) found that 
engineering students from low-status institutions saw their in-group as lower on the dimension of 
‘status’ than students from high-status institutions, and also evaluated ‘status’ as being more 
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important. Crucially, though, Van Knippenberg interprets this as reflecting strategic concerns on 
the part of the low-status group to both highlight the difference in status, and to claim its 
illegitimacy. Thus, emphasizing an in-group’s disadvantage – and the relevance of the 
comparative dimension – can signal psychological resistance to, rather than acceptance of, 
disadvantage.  
Ingroup Morality as a Claim for In-group Value: More is More. Sometimes more 
claimed in-group favoritism by the disadvantaged is more psychologically important than is 
recognized. Evidence of in-group favoritism amongst the disadvantaged has often been explained 
away as “social creativity” or as limited to “alternative” or “irrelevant” dimensions. This 
dismisses the possibility that disadvantaged groups may genuinely value more highly those 
characteristics and resources that they are believed to possess (e.g., Derks et al., in press; 
Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984; Simon, Glassner-Bayerl, & Stratenwerth, 1991). Thus, 
disadvantaged groups may show in-group favoritism on characteristics such as communality, 
warmth, and morality (e.g., fairness, cooperation, trustworthiness) because they actually value 
these characteristics more than those typically attributed to advantaged out-groups (e.g., power, 
competence, agency, dominance, competition).  
In contrast to the prevailing view that agency and achievement are most important to 
people, there is a great deal of evidence that moral characteristics are what people value most in 
themselves and in their in-groups (e.g., for reviews, see Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Leach et al., 
2015). In fact, Leach, Ellemers, and Barreto (2007) showed that moral traits like honesty and 
trustworthiness were more strongly tied to individuals’ identification with and positive 
evaluation of a wide variety of in-groups. Morality traits were more central to positive 
identification and to pride in the group than traits indicative of competence or warmth. In 
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addition, the most comprehensive studies of in-group favoritism found moral traits to be the only 
traits that ethnic groups around the world attributed to themselves more than to out-groups 
(Levine & Campbell, 1972). Thus, the only seemingly universal basis for in-group favoritism is 
morality.  
In addition to being central to positive group identification, morality is also central to 
having a positive reputation in society. Moral groups are groups that can be trusted. As a result, 
moral groups are seen as valuable groups, worthy of respect and of cooperation (for a review, see 
Leach et al., 2015). Interestingly, a growing body of work by Piff, Kraus, Keltner, and colleagues, 
shows that members of disadvantaged groups are, in fact, more moral (for a review, see Kraus & 
Stephens, 2012). Thus, their in-group favoritism in terms of morality appears to be based in 
social reality. Recent studies show the economically disadvantaged to behave more ethically and 
pro-socially – cheating less, following the law more, and giving more generously than the 
economically advantaged. For these reasons, it is odd to interpret the disadvantaged claim to be 
more moral than the advantaged as a compensation for material disadvantage or a justification, 
rather than as an expression of in-group favoritism in terms of a highly valued and important 
human characteristic. In-group favoritism in terms of morality, or other characteristics important 
to people’s positive self-evaluation, are probably best understood as a form of psychological 
resistance that contests disadvantage. As moral superiority is the most ubiquitous form of in-
group favoritism around the world, it is not a “socially creative” strategy designed to compensate 
for lacking a more important characteristic such as agency or power. By interpreting the (moral) 
in-group favoritism of the disadvantaged as a sign of internalized oppression, the prevailing view 
appears to interpret a clear and common type of in-group favoritism as its opposite.  
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Conclusions and Implications 
In this review, we have highlighted how the ambiguities in the psychological meaning of 
inter-group disadvantage allow psychologists to interpret any level of self-esteem, in-group 
favoritism, or out-group favoritism, as evidence of the internalization of oppression. By 
assuming the psychological meaning that the disadvantaged give to their position, psychology 
runs the risk of imposing a psychology of oppression on the disadvantaged. Instead, we suggest 
that the psychological meaning of lower self-esteem, out-group favoritism, or in-group 
favoritism must be examined as being determined from within the disadvantaged group itself. 
From this perspective, much of the apparent evidence of the psychological detriments of inter-
group disadvantage can be questioned. Indeed, we challenged the widespread assumption that 
attributing the ‘status-defining’ characteristics of power, agency, and competence to the 
advantaged shows that the disadvantaged devalue themselves. As we showed, a great deal of 
research on self-esteem and out-group favoritism can be better understood as indicative of 
psychological resistance to disadvantage. When the disadvantaged show “out-group favoritism” 
by stereotyping the advantaged as agentic and powerful they often appear to be critiquing the 
advantaged as exercising power in illegitimate and malevolent ways. And, when the 
disadvantaged show “in-group favoritism” on what are considered “alternative” domains such as 
morality and benevolence, they are not necessarily expressing “status-compensation” or “social 
creativity”. Social reality-based claims of in-group favoritism that assert that the disadvantaged 
are more moral than the advantaged can be seen as psychological resistance to disadvantage. 
While the theoretical importance of these issues is clear, a debate over the psychological 
meaning of disadvantage also raises important questions for policy and practice. As others have 
argued (e.g., Owusu-Bempah & Howitt, 1999), a preoccupation with the supposed psychological 
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detriments of inter-group disadvantage risks channeling policy towards palliative support for the 
“damaged disadvantaged,” in a manner that ultimately perpetuates their disadvantage. For 
example, Owusu-Bempah (1994) found that social workers’ preoccupation with the supposed 
internalized inferiority of black children in the UK led them to suggest radically different forms 
of intervention than was the case when the children in question were believed to be white. Their 
narratives regarding the needs of black children focused on the need for remedial ‘identity work’, 
portraying black children in inter-racial friendships as suffering from a profound identity deficit. 
In contrast, white children in these friendships were viewed as well-balanced, pro-social and 
caring. As an alternative to this ‘palliative’ framework, our analysis instead suggests that a more 
fruitful, psychology-oriented, response is to facilitate diversity in the value placed on different 
characteristics in society (e.g., by valuing moral power as much as cold competence), in a 
manner that (1) maps on to group members’ self-understanding, and (2) allows them to thrive as 
individuals and communities on their own terms. 
Due to a preoccupation with the opposite poles of protest and acquiescence, psychology 
has attended less to the many and varied forms of psychological resistance to disadvantage that 
are achieved by self-determination of its psychological meaning. Of course, psychological 
resistance may ultimately serve as a basis for direct action to reduce material disadvantage. 
However, that is not its only purpose or value. Because material disadvantage is the product of 
societal forces over which the disadvantaged have less control, it is unreasonable to expect the 
disadvantaged to focus all of their opposition on their material disadvantage. Refusing to 
internalize their position, and the attendant societal devaluation, is a more fundamental task 
(Gramsci, 1971). Indeed, what can be more important than the recognition of one’s own value, 
especially when others refuse to recognize it (Fanon, 1967)?  
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